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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,:
Case No. 12474

-vsPETER LEONARD LYON,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a criminal action for failure to stop a
vehicle at the command of a police officer, commonly known
as "evading a police officer," in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-6-169.10

(1953 as amended).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

The case was tried to a jury and appellant was
found guilty as charged and sentenced to a term of 360 days,
in the Weber County Jail, with 348 days of the term suspended
provided appellant:
1) pay a fine of $100.00;
2) pay jury costs;
3) not associate with certain individuals as
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,,
directed by the Adult Probation and Parole section;
4) surrender his license; and
5) enter into regular probationary terms.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the conviction.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 27, 1977, at 4:00 a.m., Weber State

Coll~E

Security Officer Terry Carpenter was enroute from the main
campus to the construction site of the Dee Special Event Cente:
which he patrolled several times a night to check for vandals
(T.3,12).

The center is approximately four blocks south of

the main campus

(T.5).

As Officer Carpenter approached the

intersection of Taylor Avenue and Country Hills Drive, which
lies adjacent to the Dee Center parking lot (Exhibit D), he
observed a man, identified as appellant

(T.23), lay down a

motorcycle in the intersection (T.10).

As soon as Officer

Carpenter turned the corner, appellant mounted his motorcycle
and accelerated away from the security officer's car, which
was white with a star on the door, a light bar on top and a
colored spotlight on each side

(T.4,34).

Concerned that

appellant may have stolen items from the center, Officer
Carpenter turned on his emergency lights after he determined
that appellant was not going to stop his vehicle and enable
the officer to conduct a general field investigation (T.14).
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Appellant twice turned his heau to look at Officer Carpenter
but did not stop; so the officer turned on his siren (T.15).
With the officer in pursuit, appellant ran three stop signs
(T.17,20).

As he attempted to enter a driveway from Tyler

Avenue, he lost control of the motorcycle and tipped over
(T.21).

Officer Carpenter exited his vehicle and arrested

appellant (T.21).
In his defense, appellant testified that he had had
to kick-start the motorcycle at the County Hills-Taylor Avenue
intersection (T.86).

He observed a police car following him

but believing he had done nothing wrong, he accelerated, afraid
that the officer was going to beat

hi~

up, as appellant claimed

he had been threatened by police officers for several months
(T.87).

He testified that he was attempting to get to the

home of Ogden Police Detective Bob Searle, a friend who lived
three houses from the arrest site (T.88).

Appellant admitted

that he had no Utah motorcycle license, that he ran stop signs,
and exceeded the speed limit during the pursuit, and that he
intentionally did not stop his vehicle for Officer Carpenter
(T.88,96,97).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SECURITY OFFICER WAS ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE
OF HIS STATUTORY AUTHORITY WHEN HE ATTEMPTED TO STOP APPELLANT.
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At the conclusion of the State's case, appellant
moved to dismiss on the grounds that the prosecution had
failed to prove that the college security officer was acting
within the scope of his authority when he first attempted to
stop appellant (T.51).

The trial court denied the motion and

submitted the issue to the jury (T.55).
Appellant suggests that denial of his motion was
error, claiming that Officer Carpenter was acting without lega:
authority.

The statute governing the issue, Utah Code Ann.

S 53-45-5 (1953 as amended), supports the trial court's decisi'.
providing in pertinent part:
"Members of the police or security
department of any state institution of
higher education . . . shall be peace
officers and shall also have all of the
powers possessed by policemen jn cities
. . . providing, however, that such powers
may be exercised only in cities and
counties in which such institution, its
branches or properties are located and
only in connection with acts occurring
on the property of such institution or
when required for protection of its
interests, property, students, or
employees.
" (Emphasis added)
The fundamental issue then is whether Officer
Carpenter's actions were required to protect the interests and
the property of Weber State College, specifically the Dee
Special Events Center.

In his testimony, Officer Carpenter

described the factors which let to his decision to investigatt
appellant:
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"I observed the motorcycle. As
I approached the intersection, it
caught my eye immediately because
there was no movement at all . . . He
appeared to me to lay the motorcycle
down, and out of my own wondering,
with the amount of destruction we've
had at the Dee Center, I wondered had
he been involved with something at
the Dee Center. Were his arms full
of things that he was trying to ditch
or something like that? Was something wrong with his bike? Had it
quit? I had no idea.
It was 4:00
o'clock in the morning.
I assumed
that he was either having problems or
he was hiding from me . . • "
(T.10)
"Initially when I made the turn,
my intentions were to inquire of him
who he was, what he was doing at this
time of morning . • . " (T.11-12)
"If in fact he had been on the
Dee Center, it would have been very
easy to find motorcycle prints, so
my intentions then were to get close
enough to see him, to see if he may
have had anything in his hands, if he
could have been stealing anything from
the Dee Center. That was the main
thing. .
"
(T.12)
"How was I acting? Definitely
on behalf of the college. They're
the ones that put me to check the Dee
Center. That's what my whole purpose for being there was to check the
Dee Center on behalf of the college."
(T.14)
From this testimony it is clear that Officer Carpenter
was acting in furtherance of his statutory mandate to protect
the interests and property of the college.

-5-

Cognigant of past
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vandalism at the nearby Dee Center, he sought to investigate
appellant, who was acting suspiciously, and determine if he
had stolen items from the center, the protection of which
was a duty of his employment.
The instant case is distinguishable from State in
the Interest of Hurley, 28 Utah 2d 248, 501 P.2d 111 (1972),
in which a college security officer interrogated two juvenile'
who appeared to be tampering with a vehicle parked in an
alley a half block from the University of Utah campus.

The

youth scuffled with the officer, Hurley was arrested, and cor.victed of interfering with an officer.

The Utah Supreme Coun

reversed, finding University interests "too remote and indire:
to invoke the extraterritorial exception."

Protecting the

cars of unknown persons in an off-campus alley is not analagc.
to the instant case, where the security officer intervened
because he had reasonable cause to believe that the property1
the college may have been vandalized and/or stolen by appella:
Protecting real or personal property of a college includes
surveillance, pursuit and arrest of wrong-doers, and recover:
of stolen items.

Therefore, if Officer Carpenter actually

investigated and pursued for the sole purpose of protecting
the property and interests of the college, as he so testifie:
he was acting with legal authority in conformity with UtahC:
Ann. § 53-45-5 (1953 as amended).

-6-
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The Oklahoma case, Courange v. State, 510 P.2d
961 (Okla Crim. App. 1973) is not helpful to appellant.

In

that case the college security officer arrested a person for
"driving under the influence" when the controlling statute
only authorized the security officers to protect and guard
the grounds, building, and equipment of the institution.
Since an arrest on a public road for drunk driving was clearly
outside the grant of authority, the conviction was reversed.
Hurley concludes that exigent circumstances justify
the extra-territorial exercise of power by a college security
officer, and in the case at bar compelling circumstances were
present which required Officer Carpenter to act.

If appellant

had stolen items from the Dee Center and was transporting
them to another location, recovery of the items and arrest of
the perpetrator were remote without intervention and pursuit
by the officer.

No other police cars were at the scene.

In

fact, during the pursuit, Officer Carptener radioed the Highway
Partol for assistance (T.16), but no further mention is made,
indicating that no highway patrolman joined the pursuit and
converged on the arrest location.

Therefore, given his reason-

able suspicion, Officer Carpenter was obligated to investigate
the appellant, in order that the security of the college
buildings and grounds not be jeopardized.

Respondent submits

that because the officer reasonably believed that the direct,
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immediate interests of the institution concerning its
property were involved, the exigent

circuiu~;tance

standard

of Hurley has been met and that the jury could properly
find that Officer Carpenter was acting within the scope
of his legal authority.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT GAVE AN APPROPRIATE INSTRUCTION
CONCERNING THE STANDARD

rem INTERVENTION OF SECURITY

OFFICERS

IN OFF-CAMPUS MATTERS.
Jury Instruction No. 6 provided in part:
"You are instructed that a peace
officer of a college in Utah has
authority to act on the college property. He also ~ay act in the area
surrounding the institution, but only
when it would reasonably appear to a
prudent person that such act was in
fact reasonable for the protection of
the interests, property, students, or
employees of the institution."
Appellant complains that the articulated reasonab'.'
ness standard is error as State v. Hurley, supra, enunciated
exigency doctrine and Utah Code Ann. § 53-45-5

(1953 as

arnw~

states that the off-campus actions must be required for the
protection of the
employees.

college~s

interests, property, students, ru

Respondent submits that actions which are reasoo~

in achieving the statute's protection objectives are in fact
required.

If it is reasonable for a college security office:

to apprehend a youth who has stolen a university car and is

-8-
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fleeing off-campus, it is required of the officer to do so.
Private citizens may have the option in similar circumstances
to act or not; however, in the performance of their professional
duties, peace officers must do what is reasonable to do,
especially in matters of protection.

If it is reasonable

for a security officer to take away a gun from a campus troublemaker, surely it is mandatory that he do so.
Therefore, a finding by the jury that Officer
Carpenter acted reasonably in protecting campus property was
also a finding that his actions of pursuit and arrest were
required.

While different language in the instruction might

have been more precise, under the facts of this case, reasonableness is synonymous with necessity.

If the wording was

error, it was harmless, the two standards having merged in
Officer Carpenter's professional obligation and duties.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION REGARDING HOT PURSUIT
WAS AN ACCURATE STATEMENT OF THE LAW.
As part of Instruction No. 6, the lower court
instructed the jury as follows:
"If a peace officer acts outside his
jurisdiction, he acts as an ordinary
citizen and he has no powers beyond those
of an ordinary citizen-and a person who
evades him would not be evading a peace
officer. However, if the person flees
into or through the peace officer's jurisdiction, it might take on the character
of a peace officer's activities and so
-9-
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I

continue as long as the peace officer is
in 'hot pursuit', that is directly attempting to capture or ra.tch."
Respondent contends that this instruction is
supported by Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-36 (1) (a)

(1953 as amended/

which defines "fresh (hot) pursuit":
"The term, 'fresh pursuit', as used
in this act shall include fresh pursuit
as defined by the common law and also
the pursuit of a person who has committed
a felony or who is reasonably suspected
of having committed a felony.
It shall
also include the pursuit of a person
suspected of having committed a supposed
felony, though no felony has actually been
committed, if there is reasonable ground
for believing that a felony has been committed.
Fresh pursuit as used herein shall
not necessarily imply instant pursuit, but
pursuit without unreasonable delay."
(Emphasis added)
Appellant suggests that the instruction was erronec
"since the offense involved in the present case was at most a
misdemeanor."

Respondent, however, contends that appellant's

statement is error, the Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412

(Supp 1977)

defining several classes of theft, which include felony of the:
second degree and felony of the third degree, in addition to
two misdemeanor classes.

Since Officer Carpenter was unable

to determine what was perhaps being stolen - or its value - ~'
could not assume that if a theft had occurred at the construetion site the value of the stolen item was less than $250.00,
the maximum value allowed for a misdeameanor class theft.
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Therefore, given the officer's reasonable suspicions that a
felony might have occurred, he was within the protection
ambit of the fresh pursuit statute, even if this court should
determine that he was without original jurisdiction.

Once

appellant traveled the roadway which abutted college property
on both sides (T.46), Officer Carpenter was authorized to
pursue.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION CONCERNING THE POWER
OF AN ORDINARY CITIZEN TO ARREST FOR A MISDEMEANOR WAS HARMLESS
ERROR.
Ordinarily it is error to instruct on abstract
principles of law that are not applicable to the facts before
the jury.

Since no evidence was offered at trial which would

support a finding that Officer Carpenter was acting as a
private citizen, and the state's theory of the case was that
the officer was acting within the scope of his legal authority
as a college security officer, it may have been error for the
trial court to instruct the jury that: "A private citizen may
arrest for a misdemeanor immediately observed by the citizen."
However, respondent submits that such error was
harmless under the facts of this case, where the state's evidence
was offered to prove that Officer Carpenter was acting as a
peace officer authorized by Utah Code Ann. § 53-45-5 (1953 as
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amended).

In State v. Anselmo, 558 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1977)

this court affirmcc1 a conv_iction for aqgrClvat€,d sexual
assault where the trial court gave an erroneous instruction
regarding rape of

a~

unconscious victim, and the state's

evidence indicated that the victim was alert.

Although

finding the giving of the instruction error the court held
that "since there was absolutely no way the jury could have
related the instruction to the verdict, it was harmless error.'
558 P.2d at 1327, footnote omitted.
According respondent urges the court to hold harmless that portion of Instruction No. 6 that may have been errm
as the evidence that Officer Carpenter was acting as a peace
officer is substantial, credible and supports the verdict,
~here

a~

is no showing that but for this erroneous instruction,

appellant would have been acquitted.
CONCLUSION
Because the college security officer acted within
his legal authority in pursuing and arresting appellant and
any subsequent instructional error at trial were harmless,
respondent urges the court to enter an order affirming the
verdict.
~espectfully

submitted,

ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
MICHAEL L. DEAMER
Deputy Attorney General
WILLIAM W. BARRETT
Assistant Attorney General
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